








To update NAFTA, the authors propose a distinct Canada–US
collaborative strategy, which builds on mutual incentives in the 
areas of energy security and environmental sustainability. 
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THE BORDER PAPERSMending the much-maligned North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
which recently came under attack on the United States presidential campaign trail
as a source of American economic woes, should be a central trade policy goal for
Canada and the United States. 
Job losses in American, or indeed Canadian, manufacturing cannot be traced back
to NAFTA.  In fact NAFTA has been a source of productivity increases and is one
of the anchors of the continental economy.  
This Commentary proposes a distinct Canada-US collaborative strategy for updating
NAFTA, which builds on mutual incentives in the areas of energy security and
environmental sustainability. There are four areas where greater Canada-US
cooperation is desirable and progressive and where the authors believe the incentives
favour updating: energy, water, climate change, and the environment and labour
agreements. Both countries have strong incentives to cooperate - for this reason,
revisiting sensitive issues will not kill the agreement. Rather, it will create a new
framework for moving the NAFTA agenda forward and deepening integration.
Additionally, this Commentary offers positive changes to the NAFTA treatment of
investor rights and dispute settlement provisions. Whether current politics in
Canada and the US favour such changes is the outstanding question.
If NAFTA is re-examined in 2009 or 2010, it may not be a bad thing, so long as
goodwill fosters cooperation and deeper integration. The Commentary concludes
that NAFTA should evolve, but without the threat of abrogation.  A fresh approach
to dealing with bilateral trade issues, and a new vision of shared North American
interests based on cooperation, offer a happy route forward to a more secure
relationship.
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T
he North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) remains
highly contentious in all three
NAFTA countries. In Mexico, farm
groups have demonstrated over the
final elimination of tariffs on corn,
sugar, beans, and powdered milk. In
the United States, labour unions in
manufacturing states such as Ohio
and Pennsylvania blame the trade
agreement for job losses and shuttered
factories. In Canada, critics voice
concerns over existing energy 
provisions and worry openly about
possible bulk water exports. 
During the Democratic primaries, Senators Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama, both vowed to rene-
gotiate the environmental and labour side
agreements and to make tough changes to the pro-
visions under which foreign investors can initiate an
international arbitration tribunal. This is not a first
for political tough talk. When soon-to-be Canadian
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was running for the
post in 1993, he insisted that if the Liberals were
elected, his government would seek provisions on
labour and the environment, in addition to
improvements on energy, antidumping, and
subsidies. The Liberals also sought the same energy
provisions as Mexico – exemptions from supply and
price guarantees on oil and petrochemicals – though
Canada never achieved its wish list before the pact
entered into force in January 1994. 
To a large extent, Senator Obama’s recent tough
talk on NAFTA can  be attributed to a hard-fought
primary campaign, but it seems highly likely that an
Obama presidency would bring a fresh look at
NAFTA. A John McCain presidency would face a
US populace harbouring protectionist attitudes
toward trade and investment, a sentiment unlikely 
to dissipate soon.
Yet NAFTA remains vital to maintaining trade and
investment in the three countries and helps anchor
the economic health of the North American mar-
ketplace. We reject any strategy that would threaten
to abrogate the trade pact. Instead, NAFTA needs to
be reviewed – rather than ‘end it,’ policymakers on
both sides of the border should strive to ‘mend it.’ 
But how can this be done?  How do we update
NAFTA and improve its provisions, without
endangering these same provisions that have become
part of the fabric of cross-border trade, investment
and economic prosperity? 
Several approaches have been advocated in the last
few years. Some have suggested deeper integration
including a ‘big bang’ approach that combines
greater security – a US imperative – with improved
trade and investment provisions that are principally a
Canadian goal.
1 Others have recommended a
common external tariff as a first step to deeper inte-
gration.
2These approaches never gained political
traction.
3 Rather, an incremental ‘below the radar’
approach could update and improve NAFTA. The
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America (SPP)
4 was born in 2005 but in our view,
its modest agenda has had few results.
5 Issues like
regulatory harmonization and simplification of rules
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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Institute, its staff, or directors. Many people provided helpful
comments, including Sidney Weintraub, Robert Pastor, Michael Hart, Dan Ciuriak, Jon R. Johnson, Wendy Dobson, Claude Barfield, John
Curtis, and Gary Horlick.
1 See Dobson (2002), Gotlieb (2002, 2003), Pastor (2002), Dymond and Hart (2003). 
2 See Hufbauer and Schott (2004), Goldfarb (2003).
3 Conference Board of Canada (2003).
4 The SPP was launched in March of 2005 as a trilateral effort to increase security and enhance prosperity among the NAFTA countries. Its aim was to
deepen the trade and economic relationships and increase cooperation in areas of the environment, food supply and public health. However, in our
view, it has yet to deliver on its promises. See www.spp.gov.
5 Robert Pastor (2008) agrees: "If you measure progress by examining the growth in trade, the reduction in wait times at the borders, and the public's
support for integration, all of these initiatives have failed miserably. The growth in trade in the Bush years has been less than one-third of what it was
in the previous seven years -- three percent versus 9.8 percent. The wait times have lengthened, and public opinion toward the rest of North America
in all three countries has deteriorated, in part because the United States failed to comply with NAFTA on issues (for example, trucking and softwood
lumber) of great importance to Canada and Mexico." | 2 Commentary 274
of origin, though critical to cross-border trade,
largely escape the interest of political leaders. 
Though a trilateral approach is preferable, we
believe that the nature of policy frictions today
between the US and Canada on the one hand, and
the US and Mexico on the other, differs dra-
matically. No serious trilateral negotiation is possible
without forward movement on the immigration
issue, which is so significant in the US-Mexican
relationship. However, implementation of some of
the policy recommendations in this paper will
require trilateral agreement.
We see a need for an integrated Canada-US
approach on environmental and economic issues
that straddle political boundaries. In the face of zero
progress through a big bang approach, and minimal
success through an incremental policy process,
Canada and the United States need to initiate a
distinct, primarily bilateral approach to updating
NAFTA. There are strong incentives for both
countries to move the dialogue forward in the areas
of energy security and environmental sustainability.
First, there is political will in both countries to
advance the agenda. Second, the effects of pollutants
are cross-border so any solution needs to be collab-
orative; the same rationale applies for our integrated
energy markets. Last, collaboration will reduce
transaction costs and ensure that new policy
measures do not act as disguised restrictions to trade.
In turn, niggling barriers will be reduced as poli-
cymakers work to ensure energy security,
environmental sustainability, and the development of
alternative fuels. A new collaborative strategy can
build results and benefits that could not be achieved
through national policymaking alone.
6
This analysis will proceed as follows. Part I
examines the claim that NAFTA is responsible for
manufacturing job losses and illuminates the host of
other factors at play. This is aimed at challenging the
campaign claim that reopening NAFTA will bring
back jobs lost in manufacturing states. Part II
supports continuing work on issues that are part of
the SPP agenda and provides new ways of
approaching old issues. Part III proposes a new col-
laborative strategy for updating NAFTA that builds
on mutual incentives in the areas of energy security
and environmental sustainability. Part IV identifies
NAFTA chapters 11 and 19 as areas where we
believe changes would be mutually beneficial but
may not be politically feasible. Part V proposes a
joint framework for working on key NAFTA issues.
Part I: Accounting for Manufacturing
Job Losses
As the US economy falters, Americans are increasingly
concerned about the trade deficit, manufacturing job
losses, offshoring, and whether the playing field is
tilted with respect to labour and environmental laws.
Add to this the bleak picture of soaring energy costs
and rising food prices and the outcome is populist
US disapproval of global trade and investment. 
In Canada, the domestic sentiment on trade is less
clear-cut because there are regional winners and
losers despite overall aggregate benefits. While
Canadians hear about layoffs in Ontario auto plants,
soaring prices have enriched resource-based
industries such as metals and petroleum products,
particularly in Alberta and Saskatchewan.
7 But
according to recent polls, Canadians realize that it is
in their national interest to defend NAFTA.
8
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6 We are aware of the necessity of US legislative passage for these NAFTA updates.  Though Fast Track or, as it is called today, Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA), is not available currently, we believe the choice of provisions and issues provides the context for legislative passage. We expect
close Executive-Congressional collaboration since the incentives for updating the NAFTA provisions should be as apparent to Congressional
leaders as they would be to the Administration.  Without that Congressional assent, it is unlikely that the Executive would risk re-opening the
agreement.
7 In March 2008, Canada's trade surplus widened to $5.53 billion as energy exports jumped and imports of automotive products fell. Energy
exports advanced 6.6 percent; however, industries tied closely to slumping US demand for automobiles and lumber are suffering. Automotive
products posted a 4.9 percent drop in exports during the month, while the forestry sector recorded a 7.7 percent decline. See Egan (2008).
8 According to Harris/Decima, a public opinion and market research company in Canada, 49 percent of Canadians feel NAFTA has been good
(39 percent) or very good (10 percent) for the Canadian economy. Nineteen percent feel it has been bad or very bad (8 percent). In every region,
a plurality of respondents believes that NAFTA has been a good thing. Canadians tend to think that any effort by a Democratic President to
reopen NAFTA would have a negative (38 percent) rather than a positive impact (21 percent) on Canada. Data were gathered between February
28 and March 3, 2008. http://www.decima.com/en/pdf/ news_releases/080310E.pdfCommentary 274 | 3

































FIG. 1 Figure 1: US Manufacturing Employment, 1990-2007






























Figure 2: Canadian Manufacturing Employment, 1990-2007
Source: Statistics Canada, Table 282-0094.| 4 Commentary 274
Sparking the current NAFTA debate in the
United States is the dramatic fall in the share of US
employment in the manufacturing sector – from 16
percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2000.
9 However,
the level of manufacturing employment has been
declining for decades. In the early 1940s, manu-
facturing employment peaked at 32 percent of the
labour force, but dropped below 13 percent in
2000.
10 Figure 1 traces the decline in US manu-
facturing employment since 1990: a steep recession
from 2000 to 2003 ended the surge that took place
during the 1990s, as nearly three million jobs were
lost after 2000. The automobile sector was hardest
hit. Since then, the rate of job attrition has slowed. 
Canadian manufacturing firms – benefiting
from rapid growth in the US, increased investment
following NAFTA, and a cheap Canadian dollar –
saw the number of jobs grow by 25 percent
between 1992 and 2000. Canadian industry
weathered the 2000-2003 recessions better than its
US counterpart, although Canadian manu-
facturing employment registered a 10 percent
decline over the past three years (Figure 2).
11
To put the blame for recent US adversity on
NAFTA would be to ignore underlying economic
forces in both economies – notably fast productivity
growth in manufacturing, slow demand growth,
rising energy costs, and competition from large
developing countries. The following section makes
no attempt to assess the relationship between trade,
wages, and employment; excellent literature surveys
exist.
12 Rather, the section will outline forces that
shape the current economic climate and suggest that
long-term trends in Canada and the United States
will not be reversed by renegotiating NAFTA
chapters. While improving the agreement through
revisiting certain chapters and adopting a joint
approach to trade, energy, and the environment is
central to this paper, it should not be driven by
unattainable outcomes. 
Increased Efficiency and Labour Productivity in
the Manufacturing Sector 
During the last 15 years, US manufacturing output
has increased dramatically, particularly in the 1990s.
Taking a longer view, output grew more than
elevenfold between 1940 and 2000.
13 After 1990,
US manufacturing capacity
14 expanded even more
rapidly than output (Figure 3), so that today there is
a fair amount of unused capacity.
Higher growth in labour productivity – output
per hour – in both the United States and Canada
since the mid-1990s, reflects capital investment and
new technology.
15 Despite cyclical dips, US labour
productivity growth has averaged over 4 percent
since 1997.
16
Improvements in productivity lead to higher real
wages, lower prices, and greater profits. However,
though prices of manufactured goods have fallen
relative to services, the share of GDP accounted for
by manufacturing output has been relatively
constant for 50 years. In other words, lower relative
prices have not led to increased sales. Instead, higher
productivity has led to a decline in manufacturing’s
share of total employment. Here is the paradox:
while North American factories have become far
more efficient, and while manufacturing output has
been growing, communities that rely on manu-
facturing industries have been hit by job losses. 
Shifts in Consumer Demand – 
The Automotive Industry
The automotive industry has been hard hit both 
in Canada and the United States, especially the big
C.D. Howe Institute
9 US Bureau of Labor Statistics. www.bls.gov.
10 Ibid.
11 Statistics Canada. www.statscan.com.  Table 282-0094.
12 See, for example, Baldwin (1995), Slaughter (1998), Johnson and Stafford (1999), Gaston and Nelson (2000), Feenstra and Hanson (2004),
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004). Hoekman and Winters (2005) provides some stylized facts based on broad themes covered in the literature.
13 Federal Reserve, www.federalreserve.gov.
14 Capacity is an index of the maximum sustainable output of an industry. Capacity utilization is the ratio of output to capacity and represents a good
barometer for the economy. If market demand grows, capacity utilization will rise. If demand weakens, capacity utilization will slacken.
15 As well, labour productivity is affected by the level of output; capacity utilization; the use of purchased inputs, including contract employment
services; the organization of production; managerial skill; and the characteristics of the workforce. Statistics Canada, www.statscan.ca. 
16 See US BLS Series PRS300006091. Commentary 274 | 5
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three North American firms – Ford, General
Motors, and Chrysler. The recent US financial
turmoil coupled with dramatically higher oil prices
has triggered a sharp decline in demand for auto-
mobiles. The larger energy-consuming models,
predominantly manufactured in Canada, are
becoming unpopular.
17 In addition, many
consumers are considering buying hybrid cars
despite their higher cost.
18
Table 1 shows the value of the Canadian
automotive trade balance. The year-to-year change
for medium- and heavy-duty trucks has been steadily
decreasing since 1998 – the recent sharp fall in
demand has led to a narrower trade balance with the
US as the big three struggle to remain competitive. In
17 In April 2008, General Motors announced it would lay off 3,500 workers in their pickup and SUV factories in Michigan and Ontario. Sales of
large SUVs were down 26 percent in March. Yahoo News, April 28, 2008 (article no longer available online).
18 US News & World Report (2008).
Sector Sub-Sector 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Total Motor Vehicle  29,530 37,481 28,974 27,462 18,925
Light Vehicles  27,870 36,126 28,758 27,920 18,832
Medium & 
Heavy-Duty Trucks  1,660 1,355 216 -458 93
Total Parts  -20,935 - 22,751 - 20,745 - 17,817 - 16,435
Table 1: Value of Canadian Automotive Trade Balance*, selected years ($millions)
*Trade balance = total exports (including re-exports) – imports.











































Figure 3: US Manufacturing Production and Capacity, 1990-2007
Source: Federal Reserve Annual Revision 2008.| 6 Commentary 274
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order to cut costs, all three firms have slashed jobs
and are quickly moving to smarter, more fuel-efficient
models. In absolute terms, there is less cross-border
trade both in parts and in final goods.   
These figures point to the fact that deep forces
changing consumer preferences have had a
profound impact on the automotive industry in
both Canada and the United States. 
Energy Costs
The rising cost of energy also has an adverse impact
on manufacturing activity. High-energy consuming
industries, such as pulp and paper, have adjusted to
some extent by switching to cheaper fuel sources,
but they still have been hard hit. The consequences
are not limited to a narrow range of industries. For
example, over 55 percent of US manufacturers are
dependent on the chemical industry for basic
chemicals, synthetics, paints, and coatings that are
used in everything from auto parts to pharma-
ceuticals, to diapers.
19 All these items become more
expensive as energy prices escalate.
The rising price of natural gas, which has
increased 60 percent since January 2000,
20 has led
chemical and fertilizer manufacturers to locate
offshore where natural gas (not easily transported) is
cheaper. Dow Chemical has joint ventures in the
Middle East, Kuwait, and Oman, where natural gas
prices are lower and there are opportunities for
export. In fact, of the 80 plants being built by Dow,
none are scheduled for construction in the United
States, due to both the high cost of natural gas and
US policies that limit drilling.
21
Unless the economic environment changes dra-
matically, it is unlikely that departing chemical plants
will come back anytime soon. The same is true of
other manufacturing firms that locate plants abroad
to take advantage of low-cost energy, either directly 
or by way of purchased inputs that are costly to
transport. Further detail on rising energy costs and
policy prescriptions are provided in Part III.
Rise of the BRICs
During the past 10 years, strong competition has
arisen from several emerging economies, often stylized
as the BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
In comparison to China and India, Mexican and
Brazilian growth rates are moderate, and Canadian
and US growth rates are downright sluggish (Table
2). The shift in production from high labour-cost
locations to China, India and other developing
countries has reduced the volume of manufacturing
production in Canada and the United States. The
US trade deficit with China has surged in recent
years as imports from China have grown much
faster than US exports to China (see Table 3). The
bilateral deficit rose from $30 billion in 1994 to
$256 billion in 2007 and represents 32.4 percent of
the total US trade deficit.
22
These figures do not imply that a negative trade
balance reduces the overall number of US jobs, but
rather that it quickens the pace at which production
shifts from one sector to another. To be sure, the
19 Friscia and O'Marah (2007).
20 Energy Information Administration. www.eia.doe.gov 
21 Friscia and O'Marah (2007).
22 Trade deficits are not determined by the microeconomics of trade policy or industrial competitiveness but rather reflect underlying macro-
economic factors, specifically investment flows and, ultimately, the national rates of savings and investment that determine those flows. See
Griswold (1998).
Mexico Brazil China India Canada United States
9.17 8.51 17.48 11.35 5.52 3.24
Table 2: Annual Average Growth Rates of Merchandise Exports, 1995-2005 (percent)
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007.Commentary 274 | 7
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advanced nations still have a strong advantage in
producing sophisticated manufactures, such as
aircraft, power plants and medical equipment, while
less complex products, such as textiles and electronic
components, are increasingly the province of
developing nations. But NAFTA helps ensure that
the North American economy remains competitive,
by giving producers access to a wide range of high-
quality inputs at low prices.
23
What does this recital of broad economic forces
tell us?  Manufacturing employment in Canada and
the United States has declined for reasons unrelated
to NAFTA.
24 International trade creates both
winners and losers – but, in our view, the effects of
NAFTA on trade and investment, employment and
wages, dispute settlement, labour and the envi-
ronment, and hemispheric cooperation and
integration, have been welfare enhancing.
25 Yet
evidence points to distributional effects related to
the short-run transaction costs versus the long-run
gains.
26 In addition, at the same time that manu-
facturing employment is falling, OECD countries
are shifting towards service-based economies – both
in terms of production for the home market and
exports to global markets. NAFTA has created
opportunities for services sectors. Reflecting the
shifting patterns of comparative advantage, in 2007,
the US manufacturing trade deficit was $679 billion
while the services trade surplus was $104 billion.
27
The solution for losers is not to support the
abrogation of a free trade agreement that is tan-
gentially related to their plight, especially since that
agreement provides economic gains to the whole of
North America.
28 Workers are understandably
anxious about job losses and the costs they face in
moving from the manufacturing sector to growing
sectors of the economy. Social safety nets – job
search assistance, portable pensions, continuing
health insurance, and wage insurance
29 – better
address the negative externalities of globalization. 
Country or Trading Group  US Trade Balance ($billions)
World -791.0
China -256.3
European Union (EU27)  -107.4




Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  - 50.6
Table 3: US Merchandise Trade Balances with Major Trading Partners, 2007
Source: USITC DataWeb
23 See Trefler (2004) for labour productivity gains.
24 Leamer (2007) argues that the decline is due to a larger story of strong domestic demand growth offset by strong productivity growth.
25 See Hufbauer and Schott (2005), Weintraub (2004), Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2005), and Romalis (2007).
26 Trefler (2004) finds that for those industries that experienced the deepest Canadian tariff cuts, employment fell by 12 percent and labour pro-
ductivity rose by 15 percent as low-productivity plants contracted. For industries that received the largest US tariff cuts, there were no employment
gains, but plant-level labour productivity soared by 14 percent. Simple welfare analysis provides evidence of aggregate long-run welfare gains.
27 Federal Reserve. www.federalreserve.gov.
28 See Hufbauer and Schott (2005) for a synthesis of the evidence on NAFTA’s effects.
29 Wage insurance is a program of financial assistance upon reemployment, for workers who lose jobs, for any reason, through no fault of their
own. The goal is to get workers back to work as soon as possible, while minimizing longer-term earnings losses. A key aspect of the program,
and the difference between it and other adjustment assistance programs, is the employment incentive created by making benefits conditional
on reemployment. See Kletzer and Litan (2001).| 8 Commentary 274
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In what follows, we present an agenda for
mutually beneficial reforms that can serve to deepen
North American integration – some which require
changes to NAFTA and others that do not. The
next section addresses issues that do not require
changes in the NAFTA text, though they do require
changes in national laws and regulations.
Part II: Revisiting the Security and
Prosperity Partnership (SPP)
Over the years, there has been much research on
how to improve the flow of trade between Canada
and the United States. Many of the ideas were
adopted in the SPP initiative, though in our view,
very little progress has been made in that forum. In
this section we will identify key areas covered by the
SPP where the costs of trade are increasing and
propose coordinated efforts at the federal and the
provincial/state levels.
Rising Security Concerns
Since September 11, 2001, heavy emphasis on
security has ‘thickened’ the border. The United States,
preoccupied with its efforts to thwart entry of ter-
rorists and weapons, has focused on seaports, airports,
and land borders. Inevitably, controls placed at the
northern border, rather than at the North American
perimeter, hamper commerce between the United
States and Canada. Moreover, illegal immigration and
drug trafficking across the Mexican border have
merged in the US public mind with the terrorist
threat. Thus, in October 2007, with little debate, the
US Senate almost unanimously enacted border
security measures, costing $3 billion.
30
Even before 9/11, US ports of entry were struggling
to accommodate rapidly growing traffic. For entering
cargo, stringent security regulations now require state-
of-the-art scanning equipment and highly trained
operators. Superimposed on pre-existing congestion,
the outcome is longer and more variable crossing
times, and missed business opportunities.
Econometric studies have shown mixed outcomes
from the imposition of these security measures.
Globerman and Store (2006) find that while the
effect of increased security measures on US exports
to Canada disappeared by 2005, there has been a
lasting negative impact on Canadian exports to the
United States.
31 By contrast, Burt (2007) finds little
evidence that tighter border security has reduced
export volumes. Instead, industry-specific factors,
such as the tech bust in 2000, and the softwood
lumber dispute, were more important in explaining
reduced trade flows.
In our view, whatever the residual impact of 9/11,
increased security measures promise to impose
additional costs and curtail cross-border trade. In
2007, US legislation – designed to implement many
of the remaining recommendations of the 9/11
Commission – was adopted which mandates foreign
ports to scan 100 percent of US-bound containers
by 2012.
32 Fortunately, in 2005, the United States
and Canada signed a Container Security Initiative
Partnership Agreement with the goal of pre-
screening imported goods destined for North
America. Owing to this initiative, sealed cargo
arriving in Canadian ports for onward shipment to
the US need not be scanned a second time at the
Canada-US border. Ideally, a joint inspection force
between Canada and the United States would
ensure that all containers arriving at the US border
from Canada – whether loaded with Canadian or
foreign merchandise – would pass. Scanning at
congested borders inevitably leads to higher costs
and less reliable shipment times.
33
The goal, however, should be inspection of all
North American containers at their points of origin,
30 Reuters (2007).
31 In Grady (draft 2008), the author finds that Canadian exports of goods to the United States, excluding energy and forestry products, are
around 12 percent lower than they would have been otherwise. Similar results are found for the export of services, a decline of 8 percent.
32 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
33 According to a recent study initiated by the World Customs Organization and undertaken by Professor Frederic Carluer of Le Havre
University, besides burdening several ports with large investments, the new law would hamper world trade by creating severe logistical
problems at ports. Carluer argues that even the leading ports in the world are unlikely to meet the 2012 deadline of 100 percent scanning and
that consumers would eventually bear the increased cost of imported goods, estimated at $100 per container. See Carluer (2008).whether in North America or abroad, followed by
sophisticated tracking as trucks, railcars, cargo
planes, and ships haul merchandise across land, air,
and sea borders. This would require technical and
personnel cooperation between Canada and the
United States and could be extended to Mexico
once capacity has improved. But the payoff of
reduced congestion costs and border waiting times
will be significant.
In addition to delays for trade in goods, restric-
tions on travelers escalated after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks. Since January 2008, the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has required
citizens of the United States, Canada, Mexico,
Bermuda, and the Caribbean who are traveling
through the region to hold a passport. This rule
hampers cross-border traffic between the United
States and Canada because many citizens lack
passports and the cost of getting one is high ($100 in
the United States for 10 years; $87 in Canada for 5
years). Alternatives to a passport are stop-gap
measures. The PASS card, SENTRI, NEXUS and
FAST are designed to move the security process away
from the border, but they have worked better on
paper than in practice, and they cost money. As a
constructive interim step, both countries could waive
fees for these programs between 2008 and 2012. Like
the defence budget, these security measures should be
financed by general revenues, not by specific charges
on affected travelers and cargo. These charges neither
target directly the problem they are meant to address,
nor do they provide a stable source of revenues. 
Regulatory Harmonization
Regulatory barriers are a key factor in separating the
US and Canadian economies. But attempts to
harmonize North American standards or to embrace
the European concept of mutual recognition run
into three obstacles. First, even small steps require
huge effort, and the political payoff often seems
negligible. Second, many firms are happy to be
protected by local standards against foreign com-
petition. Third, national regulatory agencies prize
their missions and their jobs, and are loathe to
surrender bureaucratic turf. 
Nevertheless, recognizing the burden of regulatory
barriers, US, Canadian, and Mexican leaders launched
the Regulatory Cooperation Framework as part of the
wider SPP.
34The announced goal is to streamline reg-
ulatory processes so as to avoid redundancies and to
promote transparency in both rule-making and
information sharing. Very little progress has been
made to harmonize food safety rules.
When markets are fragmented by regulatory
barriers, resources are taken from productive
investment and from research and development,
thereby eroding incentives to innovate.
35 Hence, the
payoff from regulatory convergence would be sub-
stantial. The North American market would be less
fragmented and the number of potential entrants in
any market would rise, increasing the scope for
knowledge spillovers. Small and medium-sized
firms, as well as giants, could then sell across the
border without changing their product specifi-
cations. Production runs could be longer, and fixed
costs per unit could be lower. 
In the realm of regulatory conflict, the Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) dispute between
the United States and Canada was a model of poor
consultation and cooperation. A two-year ban
followed by burdensome requirements, and a border
still not fully open, stand as a blot on the concept of
an integrated market. Further, the Canadian
cattlemen found no recourse for the damages they
suffered from regulatory delays apparently designed
to benefit US cattle interests.
Positive lessons, however, can be drawn from the
US-Mexico avocado case. Due to a risk of avocado-
specific pests, US phytosanitary rules – pertaining to
the health of plants – blocked the entry of Mexican
avocados into the United States until 1993.
Agricultural authorities in Mexico recognized the
risks but argued that they could be controlled. US
growers resisted the opening, fearing pest infes-
tations, while enjoying high prices in the US
market. Negotiations leading to annual surveys of
pest incidence and quantitative risk assessments
Commentary 274 | 9
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34 See Hart (2006) for a longer discussion of the merits of a joint approach to regulatory convergence.
35 Scarpetta and Tressel (2002).| 10 Commentary 274
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were performed over four years starting in 1990.
Risk mitigation proved successful, and the US
market was progressively opened between 1997 and
2007.
36This case is an example of how the United
States and a partner can work together to resolve
regulatory issues, even in areas as sensitive as agri-
culture. 
As the successful avocado episode illustrates, the
obstacles to quick removal of regulatory barriers are
real. From an economic standpoint, however,
Canada would benefit from progressively adopting
US regulatory standards, particularly when they are
newly issued. From a political standpoint,
acceptance of US standards might be caricatured in
Canada as a surrender of sovereignty despite the fact
that US standards are arguably as high or higher in
quality. The political challenge is to find a path to
sensible economic solutions, perhaps starting with
less sensitive sectors. Some areas where Canadian
adoption of new US regulations can be envisaged, at
least as a default option, include pharmaceutical
testing, food labelling, electrical equipment, and
electronic gear. There would be no impediment to
Mexico doing the same.
NAFTA Tariffs and Rules of Origin
Bilateral tariffs have been eliminated on most goods,
but not all of the commerce between Canada and
the United States benefits from the agreed NAFTA
tariff preferences. In some cases, the administrative
cost of complying with NAFTA regulations to
qualify for duty-free treatment is not worth the tariff
savings; in other cases, exported products do not
qualify for the zero-tariff treatment because they do
not meet the content requirements.
37 In either case,
business firms complain that these costs need to be
reduced to promote competitiveness.
The most straightforward solution is to
eliminate the source of the discrimination:  tariff
preferences. In other words, the NAFTA countries
should gradually reduce their most-favoured-
nation (MFN) tariffs so that over time the MFN
rate and the NAFTA rate converge at zero.
38 In
fact, the United States initially proposed the elim-
ination of all developed country tariffs on
non-agricultural products at the start of the WTO
Doha Round, but few countries were willing to
accept the challenge, and US officials subsequently
shied away from their own offer. 
Tariff-free trade is an ambitious goal that
politicians may find hard to accept – yet our view is
they should take a deep breath and plunge ahead.
Hufbauer and Schott (2005) and Goldfarb (2003)
suggest that NAFTA members should deepen their
trade bargain by negotiating a common external
tariff. This idea never resonated with officials.
Attempts to harmonize the tariff schedules of the
three countries made sense to economists but scared
politicians, especially those representing farmers and
Mexican firms facing competition from China in
light manufactures.
With these political constraints in mind, joint
steps by all three partners could be taken towards a
common tariff by forming a compact to reduce –
with limited exceptions – industrial input tariffs to
zero by 2015. These tariffs are generally low for
Canada and the US, especially compared to those
applied by Mexico.
39The combination of limited
product exceptions and a longer transition period to
zero tariffs should calm fears in Mexico about a
surge of Asian imports. Of course, countries would
still have recourse to safeguard measures that permit
temporary restrictions to protect against sharp
increases in imports. Some of the limited exceptions
might include textiles, though these should be
reduced with a longer transition period. Agricultural
36 Orden and Peterson (2008). 
37 Head (2007) cites a good example of the complex rules that make it difficult for goods to qualify unless all of their principal parts are sourced
within North America. NAFTA rules do not deem a television to be North American unless its chief component, the cathode ray tube, is
made in North America; this means that the tube’s chief components, the cone and the glass panel, must also be North American.
38 MFN tariff rates are those applied to all WTO member countries that are not members of a free trade agreement with Canada or the United
States, or do not enjoy a special preference. Under the MFN principle, every country gets the lowest tariff that any country gets, and
reductions in tariffs to one country are provided also to others.
39 Mexico offers tariff preferences for most of its trade covered under FTAs in place with more than 30 countries; its MFN tariffs primarily target
goods from China, India, and South Korea. However, Mexico and South Korea launched negotiations on an FTA in August 2007. Commentary 274 | 11
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products should be on the agenda for future dis-
cussion despite their political sensitivities.
As a half-way measure to the desirable outcome of
zero duties on industrial inputs, the North
American partners could begin by harmonizing over
a short period of time the tariffs that each member
applies to third countries on an MFN basis. The key
to this approach, however, is that the standard of
convergence should be the lowest rate applied by
any NAFTA member. For example, if the US levies
a 5 percent tariff on thread but Canada and Mexico
levy 7 percent tariffs, the latter two countries would
reduce their tariffs to the US level. The convergence
calculations would be based on applied tariff levels –
the actual tariffs – rather than the WTO bound
rates that might be higher.
40
Movement toward this implicit common tariff for
industrial inputs need not be bound in WTO
schedules – though this could be done in the
context of a reciprocal tariff deal among WTO
members. To encourage other countries to par-
ticipate in a multilateral tariff reform, the NAFTA
countries could include a provision that would allow
them to restore their tariffs on specific products to
WTO bound rates. 
There have been marginal results in simplifying
rules of origin: since the initiation of the SPP, rules
of origin provisions have been removed on $30
billion of goods. However, in reality, this amount is
less than the growth of annual trade in North
America.
41The lack of progress in the SPP signals
that an incremental approach is not working. In the
next section, we will propose a new cooperative
framework on trade, energy and the environment. If
this framework is put in place, serious impediments
to trade can be addressed. 
Part III: New Directions for NAFTA
Cooperation 
Both Canada and the United States should rene-
gotiate specific aspects of NAFTA. Unlike some, we
do not believe the agreement is fragile. There are
four areas where greater Canada-US cooperation
42
is desirable and progressive and where we believe the
incentives favor updating: energy, water, climate
change, and the environment and labour
agreements. 
Both countries have strong incentives to
cooperate – for this reason, revisiting sensitive issues
will not kill the agreement. Rather, it will create a
new framework for moving the NAFTA agenda
forward and deepening integration.
Chapter 6 – Energy 
During the ‘Three Amigos’ summit in April 2008,
Prime Minister Stephen Harper took the
opportunity to issue a veiled threat to the United
States regarding NAFTA renegotiation. Canada is
the largest and most secure supplier of oil and
natural gas to the United States but, according to
the Prime Minister, “[i]f we have to look at this kind
of an option [a renegotiation], I say quite frankly,
you know, we would be in an even stronger position
now than we were 20 years ago. And we will be in a
stronger position in the future.”
43 Though the
warning is political rhetoric, Harper’s statement is
also a response to critics who have long felt that,
under NAFTA, Canada can do little to curtail oil
exports to the US, even during times of shortages at
home.
44These criticisms have jeopardized an honest
discussion of the future of Canada-US energy trade
40 Bound tariff rates are those negotiated and incorporated in a country’s schedule of WTO concessions. Raising a tariff above the bound rate
invites retaliation by other WTO members.
41 Pastor (2008).
42 We will identify where Mexico’s participation is essential for proposed changes but we will not discuss the economic or political motivations or
incentives behind it.
43 Greenaway (2008).
44 According to a Harris/Decima poll, most Canadians (61 percent) would endorse the idea of using energy exports as a bargaining chip in any
NAFTA renegotiation; only 24 percent oppose the idea. This idea was popular across all demographic groups.
http://www.decima.com/en/pdf/news_releases/080310E.pdf| 12 Commentary 274
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and have led to calls in Canada to husband its own
resources.
45
CRUDE OIL:  With 179 billion barrels of proven oil
reserves (95 percent are oil sand deposits in Alberta),
Canada is second in supply only to Saudi Arabia
and provides 17 percent of US oil imports.
46 In
2007, Canada exported nearly 2.5 million barrels
per day of crude oil and refined products to the
United States.
47 Most of the Canadian exports go to
Western areas of the United States, as they are well
connected to Alberta by oil pipelines. In 2007,
Canada imported roughly 1.2 million barrels per
day of crude oil and refined products for the Eastern
provinces, mainly from Algeria, Norway, and the
United States.
48
NATURAL GAS: With the largest reserves in the
world, the United States is virtually self-sufficient in
natural gas but imports roughly 10 percent of con-
45 Practically speaking, the oil price is set on international markets and in the event of emergency, oil prices will be high in Canada so there is an
incentive to sell to Canadians. Should this crisis be of mythical proportions, Canada could abrogate from the NAFTA.
46 US Department of State, Background Note: Canada, May 2008. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm
47 By comparison, the United States imported 1.5 Million barrels per day (Mbpd) from both Mexico and Saudi Arabia, slightly less from
Venezuela and Nigeria (1.3 and 1.1Mbpd) and 5 Mbpd from other sources. EIA International Petroleum Monthly, April 2008, Table 4.10.












































Production Net Imports Consumption
Figure 4: Production, Consumption, and Net Imports of Natural Gas in the United States, 1990-2007
Source: EIANatural Gas Monthly, May 2008.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
US Imports 40.6 42.2 43.0 39.5 42.9 48.5 38.4 36.5 29.3 33.0 42.9 41.5
US Exports 2.7 2.0 7.5 11.7 12.9 12.6 16.1 15.2 23.6 22.5 19.3 23.4
Table 4: US-Canada Electricity Trade 1995 to 2006
Source: Electric Power Annual 2006 Table 6.3.Commentary 274 | 13
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sumption to meet residual domestic demand. In
2006, Canada exported 3.6 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas to the United States, or over 86 percent
of total US imports. Imports of natural gas by the
United States have risen substantially since the mid-
1980s, when pipeline imports from Canada began
to meet increased consumption needs while US
domestic production remained stable (Figure 4).
49
This also coincided with the deregulation of the
Canadian industry in 1986 and the requirement
that Canada hold 30 years of proven supplies in
reserves.
50This ratio is fairly constant as potential or
probable resources are converted to proven reserves.
ELECTRICITY: The electricity networks of Canada
and the United States are heavily integrated:
51 the
grids represent more than $1 trillion in asset value,
cover more than 320,000 km of transmission lines
operating at 230,000 volts for more than 950,000
megawatts of generating capability. They provide
business for nearly 3,500 utility organizations
serving well over 100 million customers and 283
million people.
52
Table 4 shows that, while US imports of elec-
tricity have remained fairly constant, exports have
increased tenfold. Open trade in electricity is of
rising importance to Canada, and in particular the
province of Ontario, which has not invested in
developing greater electricity supply. This was
acutely evident during the 2003 Northeast
Blackout, which crippled Ontario while the affected
US states recovered far more quickly. As a result of
the blackout, the North American Electric
Reliability Organization was established in 2007 to
improve the reliability and security of the bulk
power system in North America. It is overseen by
provincial authorities and the US Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. This intergovernmental
organization is a good example of how cooperation
between Canada and the United States on energy
matters can lead to more predictable supply and
avoid service disruptions.
NAFTA LAW:Trade in energy products is governed
by the rules in Chapter 6, “Energy and Basic
Petrochemicals,” and applies to measures relating to
energy and basic petrochemical goods. These rules
were carried forward from the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) but were not
extended to Mexico, which insisted on an
exemption. NAFTA strictly interprets the rules of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and attempts to broaden them, particularly
in the area of export taxes and other restrictions.
53
The aim and effect of this approach is to limit the
ability of NAFTA parties to use dual pricing –
supplying local firms with energy below inter-
national prices – to protect or encourage
downstream industries. The interventionist energy
policies prevalent in Canada during the 1970s and
1980s created strong opposition from oil-producing
provinces, notably Alberta, which challenged the
constitutionality of the federal export tax that was
entrenched in the federal government’s National
Energy Program in the 1980s.
54The United States
also opposed government intervention – thus a
market-driven approach to energy trade was
imperative during NAFTA negotiations.
NAFTA removes all tariffs and quantitative
restrictions on energy products but stops short of
49 Energy Information Administration/Annual Energy Review 2006, Table 6.3
50 Gordon Laxer and John Dillon (2008) of the Parkland Institute and CCPA recently claimed that Canada’s natural gas reserves are dwindling
and that there are only 9.3 years of proven supplies left. However, this ratio (of proven reserves to production) has been constant for nearly 20
years and is in line with the reserves held in the US. In addition, it ignores the vast potential resources that could be and are being converted to
proven resources. Prior to this, Canadian law required 30 years of proven reserves – therefore, the sharp decline in reserves is the adjustment to
US levels and monetization of artificially inflated stocks of supplies. 
51 It would be difficult to apply the proportionality requirement to electricity because these are regional and not national. Export decisions are
made on a grid-by-grid basis. 
52 Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada (2004).
53 UNCTAD (2000).
54 Though disputed, according to Helliwell and McCrae (1981), the residents of Alberta lost roughly $46,000 per capita and Canadians outside
Alberta gained $7,500 per capita as a result of the NEP. See also Mansell and Schlenker (1995). | 14 Commentary 274
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writing rules that ensure an integrated market. The
concerns regarding NAFTA’s competency in energy
matters are largely Canadian and stem from fears 
of scarcity. There are four provisions in Chapter 
6 that directly or indirectly affect Canada’s ability 
to restrict exports: Article 603(2), which prohibits
the use of minimum or maximum export-price
requirements; Article 604, which prohibits the use
of export taxes or duties; Article 605, which enu-
merates the conditions under which Canada can
restrict energy exports; and Article 607, which
provides exemptions for national security scenarios. 
The most contentious provision for Canadians is
Article 605, the ‘proportionality’ obligation, which
allows governments to impose export restrictions on
NAFTA parties on the grounds of conservation of
exhaustible resources, supply shortages, price stabi-
lization, and national security – but the restrictions
must be ‘proportional’ to the prior ratio of exports
to total energy supplies. This obligation arose both
out of US concerns of a return to Canadian export
restrictions and out of Alberta’s insistence, as an
emerging energy superpower, that the federal gov-
ernment should have little say in provincial energy
matters. In return – and this is particularly
important since 9/11 – the United States agreed to a
narrow interpretation of national security to assuage
Canadian apprehensions about the unwarranted
invocation of disguised restrictions to trade. 
The proportionality obligation states that, if
supplies are restricted on the grounds of con-
servation of exhaustible resources, supply shortages,
or price stabilization, then the share of total supply
available for export purchase may not fall below 
the average level in the previous 36 months. For
example, if the ratio of total export shipments to
total supply was 1:3 for the previous 36 months, 
the requirement would be breached if an export
restriction were imposed by government (as
opposed to the operation of markets) in such a way
that exports were less than one-third of total supply.
Thus, the proportionality requirement does not
guarantee a level of supply to the United States but
rather a level of access. Note that the proportionality
provision aims to prevent government actions, not
market forces, from restricting exports. However, it
does preclude a ‘Canada-first’ policy since it ensures
a market-oriented approach to energy trade – an
approach most developed countries have already
taken on other basic goods. 
However, many Canadian citizens, research
institutes, and non-governmental organizations have
called for a trans-Canada energy pipeline.
55 Under
current arrangements, Canada exports energy from
the West but it imports in the East. This is viewed
as according higher priority to US energy needs
than to Canadian uses. The capital costs of building
a trans-Canada pipeline are roughly $4 million per
kilometre, for a total capital cost of $12 billion, and
operating costs of $1 billion per year. This works
out to an additional 7.5 percent annually of trans-
portation costs at current prices.
56This figure
assumes everything works well – but of course
several risk factors could raise costs, including the
environmental impact of new infrastructure,
payment for indigenous land rights, construction
delays, and provincial or municipal resistance to the
project. Further, Canada currently does not have
sufficient refining capacities to meet the East’s
needs, so new refineries would need to be built;
where this would happen is unclear given their
unpopularity. In our view, this is not the way
forward.
55 See work by the Parkland Institute and the Council of Canadians. Laxer (2008) argues that we export two-thirds of our oil to the United
States but import oil to meet 90 percent of Atlantic Canadians’ and Quebeckers’ needs from politically volatile countries. The problem
according to Laxer is not only the proportionality clause but the fact that we cannot divert exported oil during emergencies to Eastern
Canadians because there is insufficient pipeline capacity between West and East. 
56 This estimate is calculated by inference. The Alberta Clipper pipe from Hardisty, Alberta to Gretna, Manitoba cost $2.2 million per kilometre
in 2007. Triple the distance, account for higher costs of running through the Great Lakes states and central Canada, add inflation, and the
figure gets closer to $4 million per kilometre. Given a distance of approximately 3,000 km from Alberta to Ontario or Quebec, capital costs
are roughly $12 billon. Capital cost is amortized at roughly 10 percent a year so the annual cost is $1.2 billion of capital costs plus $1 billion
of operating costs. If these costs are divided by the annual barrels – say 600,000/day over 365 days – then the total amount works out to
around $10 per barrel. At current prices ($135 per barrel), the total transportation cost would be ($10 / $135 barrel) = 7.5 percent annually
for the first 10 years. Special thanks to Roy MacMullin for the intuition.C.D. Howe Institute
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Canada would be unwise to bow to nationalistic
demands and push to repeal the proportionality
obligation in any potential negotiation. But the
United States should take this threat seriously –
repealing the obligation would mean an end to pro-
portionality and the ban on export taxes in a period
of rising energy costs and unstable supply. Keeping
the status quo with Chapter 6 serves both countries
well. In the case of Canada, it would be political
suicide for the Canadian federal government to
restrict energy exports flowing from three provinces:
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland. Doing
so would ignite a full-blown political war where
tensions already exist – not just between the federal
government and the oil-producing provinces but
between East and West. Second, while Canadian
critics argue that the proportionality clause prevents
Canada from developing its own energy policy and
that the obligation protects supply to the United
States to the detriment of Canadian consumers (par-
ticularly those on the eastern coast),
57 the fact is
that cross-border regional supply chains provide far
more security in terms of delivery and price. Third,
trade and regional supply chains have created an
integrated energy market: the two countries are now
linked by 22 petroleum pipelines, 34 natural gas
pipelines, and 91 electric transmission lines.
58 Both
economies would suffer an economic and political
crisis if there were an attempt to alter energy-trading
patterns. This is lose-lose for both Canada and the
United States.
An integrated continental strategy (implicit in the
NAFTA chapter), which includes sustainability and
reduced energy dependence, offers a far more
palatable direction for Canada and for the United
States. The realistic approach is to seek sustainability
and energy security on a cooperative basis. A
Working Group should be established to focus on
the economic and environmental aspects of growing
bilateral energy trade (as proposed by the Energy
Consultative Mechanism in July 2008). A joint
effort would cover consultations on risk mitigation
and cooperative emergency arrangements. In
addition, cooperation should be the route for
increasing spare electric capacity, possibly through
publicly guaranteed ‘take or pay’ contracts for new
power plants and transmission lines.
59 A cooperative
approach would also help deal with market failure
obstacles that retard the development of alternative
energy supplies – wind, solar, nuclear.
Whither Water? 
Bulk water exports have been a contentious issue for
some time – politicians have on numerous occasions
stressed that bulk water exports are neither part of
NAFTA nor a commercial good available for
exchange. Bulk water removal refers to large-scale
shipments of water by man-made diversion, such as
tanker ships or trucks, canals, or pipelines. 
There is little political appetite in Canada for per-
mitting bulk water exports to the United States.
Canada has sought assurances from the United
States and Mexico by issuing a joint statement in
1993 declaring that NAFTA creates no rights to the
natural water resources of any of the countries.
Canada has also enacted domestic legislation. 
The potential for Canada’s fresh water to be
exported to the United States is an important public
concern, one worth clarifying legally.
60 As it stands,
the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT) is the
main legal instrument regulating the use of the
Great Lakes waters, while the GATT and NAFTA
regulate water exports more generally. The
consensus among legal scholars seems to be that,
under NAFTA and WTO rules, controls on the
57 Watkins, G. C. (1993). 
58 US Department of Energy (2006).
59 Classically, under a take or pay contract, a buyer is obliged either: (a) to take delivery of and pay for an agreed minimum quantity of gas in the
course of a year; or (b) in the event that the buyer does not take that quantity, to pay for the difference between the agreed quantity of gas and
that actually taken. See Hardaker (2000).
60 According to an IPSOS-Reid poll released April 15, 2008, only 6 percent of Canadians think that consumers represent the biggest threat to
Canada’s freshwater supply. Instead, Canadians are likely to blame mass removal of water to the United States (28 percent) and run-off of pol-
lutants from land to water (19 percent). http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3887| 16 Commentary 274
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export of bulk water are prohibited.
61 A measure to
ban exports would likely fall foul of Canada’s obli-
gations at the WTO. Under GATT Article XI, the
use of quantitative export controls is prohibited;
thus, to deter exports, the Canadian government
would have to impose an export duty or tax
(exempting NAFTA partners). Article XI would
only apply if water were defined as a good – which,
at the moment, is not explicitly done either in the
GATT or in NAFTA. According to a study done by
the Canadian government, the fact that a provincial
or municipal government in Canada has allowed the
extraction and transformation of some water into a
good (including for export) does not mean it has a
set a precedent for other governments.
62This view
is reinforced by the International Joint Commission,
which concluded that NAFTA and WTO
agreements do not constrain decisionmaking on
whether to allow exports or not; nor do they force
governments to undertake new sales or diversions
even if these have been done in the past.
63
A second legal issue arises from Canada’s obli-
gations under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which
provides extensive rights and privileges for foreign
investors who, in turn, can enforce these rights
privately by collecting compensation from gov-
ernments when a violation of NAFTA privileges is
demonstrated. Private investor-state arbitral
tribunals decide the cases. 
The question remains whether Canada should be
concerned about legal challenges and murky
language. Some have argued that there is no
business case for bulk water exports so concerns
regarding water are moot.
64 However, others have
argued that there is a real and significant risk that
US firms may explore the provisions under NAFTA
and seek to import bulk water and, thus, Canada
needs to be proactive.
65
The topic of bulk water exports has arisen in
three main areas: 1) large-scale export for irrigation;
2) small-scale export for municipal use; and 3) as an
input for energy, in particular electricity and uncon-
ventional hydrocarbons (e.g., shale oil and gas, gas
hydrates). According to a report produced by the
Policy Research Initiative,
66 bulk water exports for
irrigation are neither economically nor politically
viable since Canadians would oppose any large-scale
diversion schemes necessary to transport the water
south. The report does, however, suggest that small-
scale movement of water between border
communities would be efficient and the business
case could change. As an input for electricity gen-
eration and producing unconventional
hydrocarbons, the demand for water is great. 
It is likely that the NAFTA would be given
precedence over domestic legislation; if contested,
domestic legislation would not be binding on
NAFTA panels.
67 Given this state of affairs, and for
environmental sustainability reasons and not for
trade protection, Canada should seek to ensure that
bulk water exports to the US or elsewhere are pro-
hibited. However, climate change and technology
might lead to environmental conditions that could
bring about political reconsideration. Canada
should leave open the possibility of revisiting the
arrangement after a given time period, say 10 years.
Water management should be part of a bilateral
agenda, trilateral if necessary.
61 A good overview of the legal background can be found in Nikiforuk (2007) and Johansen (2001).
62 See Johansen (2001).
63 See International Joint Commission (2000). Pages 32-34 of the report deal with trade issues.
64 Policy Research Initiative (2006).
65 See Boyd (2003), Nikiforuk (2007), Quinn (2007), and www.patcarney.ca/priorities.html#  on Bill S-217.
66 Policy Research Initiative (2006).
67 Current domestic legislation includes a private member’s bill, S-217, to amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act by prohibiting bulk
water exports (http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/Senate /Bills/392/public/S-217/S-217_1/S-217_text-e.htm). The Munk Centre for
International Studies (MCIS) has gone further and drafted “A Model Act for Preserving Canada’s Waters” (2008) which uses a water basin
approach – the view that inter-basin transfers of water would violate ecosystem integrity -- instead of a political approach (e.g., outright ban)
which would likely run foul of Canada’s trade obligations. Rather than focus on the legality or illegality of a political approach, the Model Act
focuses on the irreversible environmental effects as justification. C.D. Howe Institute
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Making Good on Commitments to 
Reduce CO2 Emissions
The United States is the second largest emitter of
carbon dioxide (CO2) in the world after China. By
2030, Canada could have the highest energy-related
CO2 intensity (relative to GDP) within the
OECD.
68 Both countries have room for
improvement, but conflicting emission standards
could potentially disrupt trade. Six major bills in the
US Congress aim to limit GHG emissions by as
much as 80 percent below 1990 levels over the next
30 years. In Canada, opposition Liberal leader
Stéphane Dion has proposed a broad-based carbon
tax while British Columbia introduced a new
carbon tax in July 2008, starting at a rate that will
have drivers paying about an extra 2.4 cents per litre
at the gas pump. Ontario and Quebec are talking
enthusiastically about a cap and trade program as is
the federal Conservative government. 
On the question of climate cooperation, NAFTA
leaders ‘talk the talk,’ but they have yet to ‘walk the
walk.’ The North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation has long advocated
renewable energy production, green supply chains
and green building projects but few have heard of
them. The United States and Canada established a
Bilateral Working Group on Climate Change, but
its last session was held in 2005. This working
group needs to be reactivated and expanded. In
August 2007, the three NAFTA leaders, meeting in
New Orleans, promised clean and sustainable
energy. So far these pronouncements have done
nothing to arrest the trajectory of GHG emissions
from North America, but they have set the stage for
measures that could well interrupt the free flow of
commerce. 
In fact, US efforts to promote alternative fuels
and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have already
distorted regional trade and raised food prices.
Ethanol from corn is a culprit, but sugar trade
between Mexico and the United States has triggered
its own ethanol battle. Bills now on the con-
gressional docket would endorse additional subsidies
for biofuels and border taxes against carbon-
intensive imports, presaging new barriers to North
American trade. A climate change bill with some of
these provisions is very likely to pass in Congress in
2009, though it recently faltered in its first
attempt.
69 Similar legislation will certainly be vetted
in Canada if a carbon tax or a greenhouse gas
emissions permit system is enacted by Congress.
Given this context, NAFTA leaders should work
hard and fast, beginning in January 2009, to forge
common industrial standards and competitiveness
provisions that will apply to regional trade. A coop-
erative effort is essential for monitoring GHG
emissions and creating an efficient trading market
for North American emission permits. If the United
States and Canada develop a joint approach to
climate policy by adopting carbon taxes for example
– at this writing, against long odds – they should
make every effort to agree on the same base and
rates, so that border adjustments are unnecessary in
North America. 
Future negotiations on climate change are likely
to bring about stricter climate reduction goals than
Kyoto. Regional cooperation can ease these burdens,
for example by investing in emission reduction
projects across the Western Hemisphere, and by
developing clean technologies that will be licensed
for free or at affordable rates across the globe.
70
Equally important, with meaningful regional coop-
eration, Canada and the United States can avoid
placing new impediments on North American
trade, even as they adopt stern measures to reduce
their own emissions. 
68 EIA (2007).
69 “The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007” (S. 2191) http://lieberman.senate.gov/ documents/lwcsa.pdf; “The Lieberman-Warner
Climate Security Act of 2008” (S. 3036) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.3036::.
70 One possibility would be that suggested by Diane Francis, Editor-at-Large of the National Post, in her blog dated June 14, 2008: “The three
countries should finance a Manhattan Project to come up with environmentally benign alternatives, conservation methods and technologies to
better utilize oil and gas.” The Manhattan Project refers to the joint cooperation of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to
develop the atomic bomb during World War II.| 18 Commentary 274
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The Side Accords on Labour and Environment
In 1993, President Clinton insisted on negotiating
side accords on labour and on the environment
before submitting NAFTA to Congress. While they
contributed to NAFTA’s ratification by a narrow
margin that December,
71 the side accords never
satisfied US labour unions and quickly disappointed
most environmental NGOs.
Union officials charged that the North American
Agreement on Labour Cooperation had no teeth:
the new obligations were inadequate to address their
concerns about low-wage competition from Mexico.
Moreover, the enforcement procedures – which
excluded labour issues from NAFTA’s basic dispute
mechanisms – seemed too weak. At the insistence of
Canada and Mexico, the agreement was written to
include special dispute resolution processes long on
consultation, with very limited recourse to lit-
igation. Environmental NGOs highlighted a more
specific complaint: they attacked the pact’s investor-
state dispute provisions for opening a new legal
channel for investors to contest environmental
policies (see the section below on Chapter 11). Even
groups supporting NAFTA were lukewarm about
the side accords. Business lobbies grudgingly
accepted the inevitable, but vigorously opposed sub-
sequent proposals to strengthen the accords for fear
that current US policies could be challenged in
trade cases and result in costly new regulations.
In practice, the two side agreements actually
make modest improvements in labour and envi-
ronmental policies in the three countries.
72 Perhaps
the most noteworthy aspect has been their spotlight
effect – that is, creating public platforms where
private groups can name and shame abusive
practices. Labour issues, however, represent a real
challenge for Canada, and specifically, its con-
stitution. Labour questions fall under both
provincial and federal jurisdiction. As a result, the
current labour agreement requires ratification by the
provinces in Canada. The Canadian
Intergovernmental Agreement regarding the
agreement provides a mechanism for provincial par-
ticipation, but so far this has been signed by only
four of Canada’s 10 provinces – Alberta, Manitoba,
Quebec and Prince Edward Island. This agreement
gives the provinces a means to participate in
managing Canada’s involvement in the labour coop-
eration agreement. But with the combined
participation of these provinces and the federal gov-
ernment, the agreement now covers less than 50
percent of the Canadian workforce. Thus it is
unclear how changing the agreement will impact
Canada.
While the side accords broke new ground when
introduced in 1993, their core rights and obligations
could never be considered the ‘gold standard,’ and
within a decade, NAFTA provisions in these areas
had been eclipsed by new arrangements. Negotiators
learn by doing, and subsequent free trade
agreements (FTAs) have improved upon NAFTA’s
skeletal regime on labour and the environment.
Recent FTAs embrace more comprehensive rights
and obligations in the main treaty text, and have
been supplemented by bilateral cooperation accords
that seek to develop joint responses to labour and
environmental problems in the partner countries. 
In May 2007, the Bush administration agreed to
revise US trade pacts awaiting congressional rati-
fication to accommodate expanded labour and
environmental obligations demanded by the new
Democratic majority in Congress. Peru, Colombia,
Panama, and South Korea readily incorporated these
additional provisions into their FTAs with the
United States. New demands to strengthen the FTA
provisions on labour and the environment did not
encounter significant resistance from US trading
partners because the obligations reflect principles
those countries had already adopted in the
International Labour Organization and largely
incorporated in their own laws and regulations.
73
71 The NAFTA passed the House by a vote of 234 to 200 and the Senate by a 61 to 38 margin.
72 See Hufbauer and Schott (2005), chapters 2 and 3.
73 In large measure, Canada’s negotiations with Latin American countries follow the precedents established by the May 10 accord between
Congress and the Bush administration. See, for example, the text of the Canada-Peru Labour Cooperation Agreement signed May 29, 2008.C.D. Howe Institute
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Including similar provisions in NAFTA should
be part of the regular updating of the pact that
trade Ministers undertake during the annual
meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.
We believe that adopting the standards on labour
and environment set out in the Peru FTA is
desirable on the merits; in addition, it should
mitigate the specific political concerns about
NAFTA raised by Senators Obama and Clinton
during the Democratic primary. Indeed, Senator
Obama cited the new provisions on labour and
the environment as the reason he voted in favour
of the Peru-US FTA.
74 To complement these
textual reforms, we recommend increased
funding for specific projects undertaken by the
North American Development Bank
75 to redress
infrastructure problems and environmental
abuses. The Bank has been under-funded from
the start, and its capital base needs to be doubled
in the near term with more resources over a 
10-year horizon. While these improvements 
are valuable they are not vital bilateral issues. 
Our discussion reflects in part the insistence 
of US politicians to answer the quest for 
NAFTA revisions.
Part IV. The Highly Contentious Issues  
Chapter 11 governing investor-state relations and
Chapter 19 covering dispute settlement have created
concern and even acrimony between Canada and
the United States. We have some suggestions on
improving these provisions however, the political
realities may not warrant trying to make changes to
the current text. 
Investor-State Dispute Provisions
NAFTA broke new ground with Chapter 11 by
incorporating provisions to resolve investor-state
disputes. Instead of relying on Mexican courts, with
their chequered history of adjudicating expro-
priation and other investment cases, NAFTA
established an international arbitration channel for
resolving investment disputes. Under Chapter 11,
disputes between private NAFTA investors and the
member states can be heard by international arbi-
tration tribunals. For Mexico, the establishment of
investor-state provisions, drawing on international
standards and superseding Mexican reliance on the
Calvo Doctrine,
76 represented a major revision of
Mexican legal culture. Negotiators thought they had
found a pragmatic solution to business concerns
about protections afforded under the Mexican court
system. Mexican officials accepted this intrusion
because they thought that increased juridical
security would improve the climate for US and
Canadian investment in Mexico. Some investment
experts hailed these provisions as “a most innovative
and favourable element of the accord.”
77 And
foreign direct investment poured into Mexico. 
Officials from the NAFTA parties thought that
investor-state disputes would primarily involve
Mexican laws and regulations. But the subsequent
caseload has had a broader geographic reach.
Investors utilized the investor-state provisions to
bring claims against all three NAFTA parties.
Indeed, over the period 1994-2007, nine claims
were filed against Canada, 18 against Mexico, and
15 against the United States.
78 Several of the cases
drew headlines with exorbitant claims for injury and
redress, including the Methanex Corporation
dispute over California’s environmental regulations
74 See text of Obama’s speech on US policy toward the Americas on May 23, 2008 in Miami. www.miamiherald.com/1060/v-
print/story/544657.html.
75 The North American Development Bank (NADB) and its sister institution, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), were
created under the auspices of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to address environmental issues in the U.S.-Mexico border
region.
76 Under the Calvo Doctrine (which originated in Argentina), the claims of foreign investors could be adjudicated only by the courts of the host
country.
77 Graham and Wilkie (1994). p.19.
78 These are instances where the case actually went to arbitration. See US Department of State website for a list of cases.
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that banned the use or sale of the gasoline additive,
MTBE. In the end, the Methanex claims were
dismissed after lengthy arbitration. 
Chapter 11 has solicited outsized reactions by
various interest groups, most notably environmental
NGOs. Concerns have been raised over the size of
claims and possible undermining of environmental
regulations. Moreover, environmental advocates
have argued that the threat alone of investor-state
claims has a chilling effect on regulatory
rulemaking. Environmentalists are concerned that
possible big-ticket cases could erupt, linked to a new
wave of environmental controls seeking to curb
GHG emissions.
The politics of Chapter 11 have become evident.
While it is true that the threat of action exists, in
practice the number of claims raised is insignificant:
in the first 10 years of operation, only 42 cases have
been initiated pursuant to Chapter 11 and only six
resulted in the investor successfully winning
damages. Moreover, the amounts awarded were
minimal in comparison to original investor claims.
79
Finally, it is worth remembering that any claims by
investors are restricted only to money damages; no
other relief is available to claimants. Chapter 11
provides no provisions that alter or change national
laws or regulations and thus, many of the concerns
raised over public policy seem misplaced. 
Notwithstanding the limited exercise by investors
of these investor protections against all three gov-
ernments and their even less successful results,
interest groups and some politicians in the United
States and Canada have urged the elimination or
significant revision of investor-state provisions in the
NAFTA context. During the 2008 presidential
primaries, for example, Senator Barack Obama
argued that the investor-state dispute provisions
need to be recast to “fully exempt any law or reg-
ulation written to protect public safety or promote
the public interest.”
80 Irrespective of who becomes
the next US president, the Democratic Congress
will likely press for these and other NAFTA reforms.
Again some politicians have urged that national
courts alone, and not international tribunals, should
deal with regulatory takings and that the NAFTA
process should be restricted to outright cases of
expropriation. Yet such an approach would leave
government in the position of determining the rea-
sonableness of its own laws and regulations. That
approach seems unlikely to ferret out policies that
are discriminatory. 
What is the purpose of providing investor-state
protections and are the NAFTA provisions unrea-
sonable? A look at global investment makes clear
that almost all countries today enter into kindred
provisions. There are now more than 2,000 Bilateral
Investment Treaties which are either stand alone
instruments or, as in recent US practice, are
embedded in FTAs. Such agreements extend
globally to include countries such as Russia,
Singapore and South Korea. As Thomas Walde, an
international advocate in investment and energy law
has argued, “[i]nvestment arbitration can best be
seen as one of several instruments which can be
employed to encourage economic reform policies
and to anchor them in external disciplines and pro-
cedures which are less subject to domestic political
volatility.”
81 Advocates for a return to national court
oversight in the United States, Canada and Mexico
fail to understand that the international standard is
widely recognized and accepted globally. Beyond
that, if the international standard were to be
removed in North America it would lead to the
anomalous prospect of investors based in many
other countries having rights that are denied to US,
Canadian and Mexican investors in North America. 
It may be that a new tripartite commission should
screen claims for their relevance to the intent of
Chapter 11 before a full-blown arbitration can be
launched (in other words, a preliminary deter-
mination of legal standing). Thereafter, it seems
79 Alexandroff (2006).
80 Obama letter to the Wisconsin Fair Trade Campaign,  February 18, 2008.
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reasonable, in the limited number of genuine
investment cases that arise, to allow the inter-
national process to run its course. Chapter 11, in its
current form, should be protected.
Chapter 19: Dispute Resolution 
For Canada, the elimination or amelioration of US
anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties
(CVD) was a critical objective of Canadian nego-
tiators in the CUSFTA negotiations.
82 Indeed
Canada’s hope was the complete elimination of the
application of AD/CVD laws as between the two
trading partners, or at least a common code to
define permissible and impermissible subsidies. The
failure to achieve much progress in the CUSFTA
toward that end caused the Canadians to suspend
the talks and threatened the complete collapse of
free trade negotiations. Only last minute and high-
level intervention by officials from both countries
saved the negotiations. They agreed on an appeal
process from national agency determinations and
the review of AD and CVD decisions by a special
binational panel,  in lieu of recourse to the domestic
appeals court. 
This dispute resolution process was adopted in
NAFTA. Practitioners have generally applauded the
review process set out Chapter 19. In the early days
of NAFTA, a 1995 report by the US General
Accounting Office found that a number of practi-
tioners believed that panels dealt more thoroughly
with the facts than the US Court of International
Trade.
83 By 1997, officials from all three countries
and private sector representatives thought the
system was working well. Notwithstanding a
number of US court challenges to binational panel
awards – arguing among other things that panels
had gone beyond their appropriate reviewing
function – the awards to this point have been
upheld. 
This was the state of affairs until the conflict over
softwood lumber led to a heated “trade war.”
Canada and the United States fought over a series 
of CVD petitions from the US industry. These
petitions included an appeal to a binational panel
and peace was only established in 1996 with an
agreement between the two countries, appropriately
called the Softwood Lumber Agreement. The
agreement required that Canadian officials levy fees
on exports of softwood lumber that exceed specified
levels. In response, the US industry agreed not to
file any further CVD petitions. The agreement had
a five-year term and in 2001 the Canadian gov-
ernment decided not to renew the agreement when
the termination date arrived. Two days after the
agreement expired, the US industry filed a new
CVD petition and for good measure, and for the
first time, added an AD petition.
The terms of the 1996 agreement, which
included export taxes, suggested that the two
countries treat the lumber industry as being outside
the traditional free trade framework. Nevertheless,
Canada sought to use both the dispute resolution
mechanisms both under NAFTA Chapter 19 and
under the WTO. The US courts were drawn into
the fracas as well. The result of this complex lit-
igation was a series of decisions from both systems,
often difficult if not impossible to square. Further
stirring the pot, the binational panel under Chapter
19 remanded back to the national regulator – the
US International Trade Commission – a decision
arguing that the Commission had arrived at a
decision without substantial evidence. The
Commission, in turn, issued a remand deter-
mination that affirmed its original finding, leading
to so-called ping-pong decisions. This charade, plus
the confusing resort to multiple forums, led the US
and Canadian governments to finally negotiate an
agreement that provided a special dispute settlement
mechanism for Canadian softwood lumber exports.
82 Antidumping duties can be imposed on goods that are deemed to be dumped – when goods are exported at a price less than their normal value
or at less than production cost – and causing injury to producers of competing products in the importing country. These duties are equal to
the difference between the goods’ export price and their normal value, if dumping causes injury. Countervailing duties reflect action taken by
the importing country, usually in the form of increased duties to offset subsidies given to producers or exporters in the exporting country.
www.wto.org/glossary. 
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The new Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006 added
a specific arbitration mechanism, separate from
Chapter 19, to resolve future softwood lumber
disputes. US reluctance to utilize Chapter 19 since
the resolution of softwood lumber, and the US
resort to various procedural means to delay the
establishment and operation of new binational
panels, suggests continued US dissatisfaction with
Chapter 19 panels. It is not too strong to suggest
that Chapter 19 is now broken.
What then should be done in the face of US
reluctance to employ Chapter 19? When Chapter
19 was created, the WTO Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures had not been written, and
the WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding was
not in place. Unlike the weak GATT system, the
WTO mechanism is a strong rule-based system with
a well-defined process to implement its rulings.
With these new rules and mechanisms in place,
NAFTA Chapter 19 is now largely duplicative. To
avoid forum shopping, it is our recommendation
that the NAFTA members now agree that appeals
from national AD and CVD determinations should
be taken to the WTO dispute settlement body.
Part V. Next Steps
NAFTA should be re-examined in 2009 and 2010.
This may not be a bad thing as long as there is
genuine goodwill to cooperate further and deepen
integration. We believe that some or all of the issues
identified in Parts II and III could form the basis of
a new US -Canada collaborative strategy and launch
a significant updating of NAFTA. Resolving Part IV
issues would be a significant bonus. However, unless
there is a baseline of understanding between the two
parties, we would not recommend proceeding.
Instead, trade negotiators should focus on issues
where collaboration is mutually beneficial.
NAFTA is not responsible for the loss of manu-
facturing jobs in the United States and Canada over
the past 14 years. A host of other economic forces
are changing the face of the North American
economy, and renegotiation of the NAFTA will not
revive manufacturing employment in the American
heartland. The exchange rate of the US dollar
against Asian currencies is far more important to the
short-term future of US manufacturing firms than
renegotiation of NAFTA. However, Canada and the
United States can certainly improve the quality of
liberalization afforded by NAFTA and make North
America a more competitive place to do business. 
NAFTA should evolve, but without the constant
threat of abrogation. What is needed is a fresh
approach to dealing with bilateral trade issues and a
new vision of shared North American interests.
Given the interconnected nature of trade liberal-
ization, energy security, and environmental
sustainability, we recommend the creation of a
framework for fruitful cooperation. As we have
suggested here, the new framework would advance a
joint approach to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, developing new measures to advance
energy security and alternative fuels, and promoting
policies to protect natural resources. These should
be drivers for a new and improved NAFTA.
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 274 | 23
C.D. Howe Institute
Alexandroff, Alan S. 2006. “Conclusion – Investor Protection in
the NAFTA and Beyond: Private Interest and Public
Purpose.” In Alan S. Alexandroff, ed., Investor Protection in
the NAFTA and Beyond.Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
Baldwin, Robert E. 1995. “The Effect of Trade and Foreign
Direct Investment on Employment and Relative Wages.”
OECD Economic Studies, No. 23, pp. 7-54.
Boyd, David. 2003. Unnatural Law. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Burt, Michael. 2007. “Tighter Border Security and its Effect
on Canadian Exports.” Ottawa: The Conference Board of
Canada. 
Carluer, Frederic. 2008. “Global Logistic Chain Security:
Economic Impacts of the US 100 % Container Scanning
Law.” Universite´ of Le Havre (July). www.wcoomd.org/
files/2.%20Event%20files/PDFs/Scanning/
Study%20Summary%20EN.pdf.
Carney, Pat. 2007. “Pat’s Priorities: Banning Bulk Water
Exports: Bill S-217, An Act to Amend the International
Boundary Waters Treaty Act.” ww.patcarney.ca/pri-
orities.html#  
Conference Board of Canada. 2003. “The Future of Canada’s
Relations in North America: From Wake-up Call to Call
to Action.” Background Paper #1. Consultative Forum on




Dobson, Wendy. 2002. Shaping the future of the North American
Economic Space: A Framework for Action. C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 162. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
Dymond, Bill, and Michael Hart. 2003. “Canada and the
Global Challenge: Finding a Place to Stand.” C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 180. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
Egan, Louise. 2008. “Data shows some cracks in Canadian
economy.” Financial Post. May 9.
http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=504253.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 2004. “Global
Production and Inequality: A Survey of Trade and
Wages.” In James Harrigan, ed., Handbook of
International Economics, Basil Blackwell.
Friscia, Tony, and Kevin O’Marah. 2007. “The Hidden
Backbone of U.S. Manufacturing: Weakening Under
Chemical Cost and Supply Pressures.” Survey by National




Gaston, Noel, and Douglas Nelson. 2000. “Globalisation and
Wages in OECD Economies: Linking Theory with
Evidence.” In Joseph Francois, David Roland-Holst, and
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, eds. Globalisation and
Employment Patterns: Policy, Theory, and Evidence. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 
Globerman, Steven, and Paul Storer. 2006. “The Impacts of
9/11 on Canada-U.S. Trade,” Research Report No. 1.
Washington: Border Policy Research Institute, Western
Washington University (July).
Goldfarb, Danielle. 2003. The Road to a Canada-U.S. Customs
Union: Step-by-Step or in a Single Bound? C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 184. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute.
Goldberg, Pinelopi, and Nina Pavcnik. 2004. “Trade,
Inequality, and Poverty: What Do We Know? Evidence
from Recent Trade Liberalization Episodes in Developing
Countries,” NBER Working Paper, 10593.
Gotlieb, Allan. 2002. “Why Not a Grand Bargain with the





––––. 2003. “A North American Community of Law.” Ideas
that Matter. Volume 2, Number 4. Toronto.
Government of Canada – Natural Resources Canada. 2004.
“Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the
United States and Canada: Causes and
Recommendations.” U.S.-Canada Power System Outage
Task Force. https://reports.energy.gov/B-F-Web-Part1.pdf
––––. 2006. “Energy Efficiency Trends in Canada, 1990-
2004.” http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/
Publications/statistics/trends06/pdf/trends06.pdf
Government of the United States (US). Energy Information
Administration (EIA). 2006. Annual Energy Review.
Report No. DOE/EIA-0384. http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/
––––. EIA. 2007. “Energy-related Carbon Dioxide Emission.”
International Energy Outlook 2007.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/emissions.html
––––. EIA. 2008. International Petroleum Monthly (April).
http://www.eia.doe.gov/ipm/
––––. US Department of Energy. 2006. Alberta Government
Luncheon Press Release. (July 14).
http://www.doe.gov/news/4059.htm
––––. US Department of State. 2008. “Background Note:
Canada.” (May)
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm
––––. US Senate. “The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security
Act of 2007” (S. 2191). http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c110:28:./temp/~c110aEhrdj::
––––. US Senate. “The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security
Act of 2008” (S. 3036) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c110:S.3036::
Grady, Paul. 2008. “How Much Were Canadian Exports
Curtailed by the Post 9/11 Thickening of the US Border.”
Draft (May).
References| 24 Commentary 274
Graham, Edward, and Christopher Wilkie. 1994.
“Multinationals and the Investment Provisions of the
NAFTA.” The International Trade Journal. 8:1 (Spring).




Griswold, Daniel T. 1998. “America’s Maligned and
Misunderstood Trade Deficit.” Trade Policy Analysis 
no. 2. Washington: The Cato Institute.
Hardaker, Guy. 2000. “Force Majeure and Take or Pay
Contracts for Power Stations: The Buyer’s Perspective.”
International Energy Law & Taxation Review (July).
http://www.hfw.com/l3/new/newl3c002.html.
Harris/Decima. 2008. “NAFTA Positioning.” March 6.
http://www.decima.com/en/pdf/
news_releases/080310E.pdf 
Hart, Michael. 2006. Steer or Drift? Taking Charge of Canada-
US Regulatory Convergence. C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary, No. 229. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
Head, Keith. 2007. “Engage the United States, Forget the
Rest?” Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP).
Draft. http://www.irpp.org/books/archive/CPA/head.pdf
Helliwell, John, and Robert McCrae. 1981. “The National
Energy Conflict.” Canadian Public Policy 7:1 (Winter).
http://economics.ca/cgi/jab?journal=cpp&view=v07n1/
CPPv07n1p015.pdf.
Hoekman, Bernard, and Alan Winters. 2005. “Trade and
Employment: Stylized Facts and Research Findings.” World
Bank Working Paper 3676. Washington: The World Bank.
Hufbauer, Gary, and Jeffrey Schott. 2004. The Prospects for
Deeper North American Economic Integration: A U.S.
Perspective. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 195.
Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
––––. 2005. NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges.
Washington: Institute for International Economics.
International Joint Commission. 2000. Protection of the Waters
of the Great Lakes: Final Report to the Governments of
Canada and the United States. http://www.ijc.org/php/
publications/html/finalreport.html
International Labour Organization. 1998. Declaration on the
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.I
NDEXPAGE.
IPSOS-Reid. 2008. “Water Poll.” April 15. http://www.ipsos-
na.com/news/ pressrelease.cfm?id=3887.
Johansen, David. 2001. Bulk water removals, water exports and
the NAFTA. Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch.
Johnson, George, and Frank Stafford. 1999. “The Labor
Market Implications of International Trade.” In O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds. Handbook of Labor
Economics, Vol. 3B. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Kletzer, Lori G., and Robert E. Litan. 2001. “A Prescription to
Relieve Worker Anxiety.” International Economics Policy
Brief 01-02. Washington: Institute for International
Economics and The Brookings Institution (February).
Laxer, Gordon. 2008. “Strategic Petroleum Reserves It’s Not
Nice to Let Eastern Canadians Freeze in the Dark.” The
Globe and Mail, February 7.
Laxer, Gordon, and John Dillon. 2008. “Over a Barrel:
Exiting from NAFTA’s Proportionality Clause.”
Edmonton: Parkland Institute and CCPA.
Leamer, Edward. 2007. “A Flat World, a Level Playing Field, a
Small World After All, or None of the Above? A Review
of Thomas L. Friedman’s The World is Flat.” Journal of
Economic Literature Vol. XLV (March).
Lederman, Daniel, William Maloney and Luis Servén. 2005.
Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Mansell, Robert L., and Ronald Schlenker. 1995. “The
Provincial Distribution of Federal Fiscal Balances”
Canadian Business Economics 3.2.
Munk Centre for International Studies (MCIS). 2008. “A
Model Act for Preserving Canada’s Waters.” MCIS
Briefings. Toronto: MCIS (February).
http://www.eausecours.org/acrobat/exportation/munkan-
glofevrier2008.pdf
Nikiforuk, Andrew. 2007. “On the Table: Water, Energy and
North American Integration.” MCIS Briefings. Toronto:
MCIS (October).
Obama, Barack. 2008. Speech on US Policy toward the
Americas. Miami, May 23.
www.miamiherald.com/1060/v-print/story/544657.html.
––––. 2008. Letter to the Wisconsin Fair Trade Campaign,
February 18. http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/wftc_oba-
maletter_02182008.pdf
Orden, David, and Everett Peterson 2008. “The Challenge of
Increasing Global Trade: How to Address Linkages and
Barriers – Drawing Lessons from Two Specific Examples:




Pastor, Robert. 2002. “A North American Community: A
Modest Proposal to the Trilateral Commission.” Toronto
(November). http://www.american.edu/ia//cnas/
PastorTrilateral.pdf.
––––. 2008. “The Future of North America: Replacing a Bad
Neighbor Policy.” Foreign Affairs (July/August). 
Policy Research Initiative (PRI). 2006. “Is there a business case
for small-scale and large-scale water export to the United
States?” Sustainable Development Briefing Note.
http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/BN_SD_BulkWat
er2_200610_e.pdf
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 274 | 25
Quinn, Frank. 2007. “Water diversion, Export and Canada-
US Relations: A Brief History.” MCIS Occasional Paper.
Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies
(August).




Romalis, John. 2007. “NAFTA’s and CUSFTA’s Impact on
International Trade.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics 89(3), pp. 416.
Scarpetta, Stefano, and Thierry Tressel. 2002. “Productivity
and Convergence in a Panel of OECD Industries: Do
Regulations and Institutions Matter?” OECD Economics
Working Paper No. 342, Paris: OECD (September).
Slaughter, M.J., 1998. “International trade and labor-market
outcomes: Results, questions, and policy options.”
Economic Journal 108, 1452-1462.
Trefler, Daniel. 2004. “The Long and Short of the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement.” American Economic Review,
94:4 (September).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). 2000. Trade Agreements, Petroleum and
Energy Policies. UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/9. Geneva:
UNCTAD.
United States General Accounting Office. 1995. “U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement: Factors Contributing to
Controversy in Appeals of Trade Remedy Cases to
Binational Panels.” GAO/GGD-95-175BR.
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154715.pdf
US News & World Report. 2008. “Consumers Interested in




Wälde, Thomas. 2004. “Investment Arbitration as a Discipline
for Good Governance.” In Todd Weiler, ed., NAFTA
Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current
Practice, Future Prospects.” New York: Transnational
Publishers, Inc.
Watkins, G. C. 1993. “NAFTA and Energy: A Bridge Not Far
Enough?” In Steven Globerman and Michael Walker,
eds., Assessing NAFTA : A Tri-national Analysis.
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
Weintraub, S. 2004. NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The
First Decade. Washington: CSIS Press.
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary© is a periodic analysis of, and commentary on, current public policy issues. James Fleming edited the 
manuscript; Heather Vilistus prepared it for publication. As with all Institute publications, the views expressed here are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Institute’s members or Board of Directors. Quotation with appropriate credit 
is permissible.
To order this publication please contact: Renouf Publishing Company Limited, 5369 Canotek Road, Ottawa, Ontario K1J 9J3; or the 
C.D. Howe Institute, 67 Yonge St., Suite 300, Toronto, Ontario M5E 1J8. The full text of this publication is also available on the Institute’s
website at www.cdhowe.org.| 26 Commentary 274
NOTESC.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 274 | 27
RECENT C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS
SUPPORTTHE INSTITUTE
For more information on supporting the C.D. Howe Institute’s vital policy work, through charitable giving or membership,
please go to www.cdhowe.org or call 416-865-1904. Learn more about the Institute’s activities and how to make a donation at
the same time. You will receive a tax receipt for your gift. 
A REPUTATION FOR INDEPENDENT, NONPARTISAN RESEARCH
The C.D. Howe Institute’s reputation for independent, reasoned and relevant public policy research of the highest quality is 
its chief asset, and underpins the credibility and effectiveness of its work. Independence and nonpartisanship are core Institute
values that inform its approach to research, guide the actions of its professional staff and limit the types of financial contri-
butions that the Institute will accept.
For our full Independence and Nonpartisanship Policy go to www.cdhowe.org.
September 2008 Dungan, Peter, Jack Mintz, Finn Poschmann, and Thomas Wilson. Growth-Oriented Sales Tax Reform for Ontario:
Replacing the Retail Sales Tax with a 7.5 Percent Value-Added Tax. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 273.
September 2008 Dachis, Benjamin. “No Free Ride: The Cost of Essential Services Designation.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief. 
September 2008 Cockfield, Arthur, J. Finding Silver Linings in the Storm: An Evaluation of Recent Canada–US Crossborder Tax
Developments. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 272.
August 2008 Johnson, David. “Heads of the Class: A Comparison of Ontario School Boards by Student Achievement.”
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
August 2008 Hogg, Peter W. “A Question of Parliamentary Power: Criminal Law and the Control of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 114.
August 2008 Kamstra, Mark, and Robert J. Shiller. The Case for Trills: Giving Canadians and their Pension Funds a Stake in the
Wealth of the Nation. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 271.
July 2008 Banerjee, Robin, and William B.P. Robson. “Greener Future:Why Canadian Workers Need More Robust
Business Investment.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2008 Chen, Duanjie, and Jack M. Mintz. The Report on 2008 Federal and Provincial Business Tax Policies. C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 270.
July 2008 Milne, Frank. Anatomy of the Credit Crisis: The Role of Faulty Risk Management Systems. C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 269.
July 2008 Busby, Colin. “Richer Than We Think: Why Canadians’ Purchasing Power Is Up While Economic Growth Is
Down.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2008 Auld, Douglas. The Ethanol Trap: Why Policies to Promote Ethanol as Fuel Need Rethinking. C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 268.
July 2008 Robson, William, B.P. “A Better Riff on Retirement: The Case for Lower Minimum Withdrawals from
Registered Retirement Income Funds.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
June 2008 Finnie, Ross, and Ian Irvine. The Welfare Enigma: Explaining the Dramatic Decline in Canadians’ Use of Social
Assistance, 1993–2005. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 267.
June 2008 Pesando, James E. Risky Assumptions: A Closer Look at the Bearing of Investment Risk in Defined-Benefit Pension
Plans. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 266.
May 2008 Ambachtsheer, Keith. The Canada Supplementary Pension Plan (CSPP): Towards an Adequate, Affordable Pension
for ALL Canadians. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 265.
May 2008 Tomlin, Ben. Clearing Hurdles: Key Reforms to Make Small Business More Successful. C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 264.
May 2008 Shiell, Leslie, and Colin Busby. Greater Savings Required: How Alberta can Achieve Fiscal Sustainability from its
Resource Revenues. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 263.
May 2008 Schirle, Tammy. Greener Pastures: Understanding the Impact of Retirement Incentives in Defined-benefit Pension
Plans. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 262.C
C
.
.
D
D
.
.
 
 
H
H
o
o
w
w
e
e
 
 
I
I
n
n
s
s
t
t
i
i
t
t
u
u
t
t
e
e
6
7
 
Y
o
n
g
e
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
,
 
O
n
t
a
r
i
o
M
5
E
 
1
J
8
C
a
n
a
d
i
a
n
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
i
l
 
S
a
l
e
s
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
#
4
0
0
0
8
8
4
8